Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Architecture of Theories', 'Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion' and 'Material Beings'

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71 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase
We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 3. Analogy
An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
There are no heaps [Inwagen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen]
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen]
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen]
If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen]
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen]
If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen]
Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen]
At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen]
Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen]
A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen]
A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen]
Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen]
The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen]
Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume]
There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume]
If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume]
How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume]
If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume]
Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume]
From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume]
Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume]
This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume]
Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume]
This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume]
Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume]
Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume]
The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume]
Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume]
A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume]
The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume]
From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume]
Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume]